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Malice as an Ingredient of Tort Liability 
 




This article is concerned with the question of whether malice is an appropriate touchstone of liability 
in tort law. It begins by identifying four torts in which malice may properly be regarded as an ingredient 
of liability (distinguishing various other torts, such as private nuisance an defamation, in which malice 
plays a merely secondary and contingent role). Having identified these four torts – ie, malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, misfeasance in a public office and lawful means conspiracy – the article 
then seeks to identify a common juridical thread which links them together.  So doing serves to rebut 
the allegation, often made in respect of all them, namely, that they are anomalies actions. It then 
concludes by considering the individual worth of these torts, bearing in mind the important difference 
between not being anomalous on the one hand, and being positively meritorious on the other.  It 
concludes that a respectable defence of each of the four torts can be made even though malice is an 






Malice plays a part in the imposition of tortious liability more than is commonly recognised. This lack 
of recognition is due partly to the fact that those torts in which it fulfils this role are seldom taught in 
university law schools, and partly to the fact that they are relatively rarely encountered by practitioners. 
True, the role of malice in a handful of nuisance cases is well known, as is the way in which it serves 
to defeat a plea of qualified privilege in the tort of defamation. But the torts in which malice functions 
as an essential ingredient of liability are anything but standard fare. For reasons that will become apparent 
in due course, it is hard to be certain just how many such torts there are. But I shall argue that there 
are four clear cases: malicious prosecution, abuse of process,1 misfeasance in a public office and lawful 
means conspiracy. 
The relative paucity of academic engagement with these four torts cannot be explained purely in 
terms of their being seldom taught in law schools and rarely encountered in practice. Another 
significant factor explaining their relative neglect by (or lack of attraction for) jurists is the fact that 
they are typically regarded as anomalous actions.2  All four of the torts just named have been described 
in such terms by jurists or judges or both over the years. Yet these allegations are unconvincing for 
several reasons. First, they are typically made by way of bald assertion,3 which ought always to raise 
                                                 
* Lancaster University. I am grateful to Peter Cane and Nick McBride for their comments on a draft. Thanks are also due 
to Roderick Bagshaw and William Lucy for informal discussion of some of the issues discussed in this article. 
1 It is arguable that this tort can be divided into two: cases in which D maliciously initiates legal proceedings in the strict 
sense, and cases in which D maliciously instigates a process short of this, eg, maliciously procuring an arrest warrant (Roy v 
Prior [1971] AC 470) or a search warrant (Gibbs v Rea [1998] AC 786). Either way, they are different. The latter (but not 
former) tort requires D’s initial action to have been abandoned or to have ended in C’s favour before it can be invoked. 
2 One exception is Arthur Ripstein. He, however, fails to distinguish those torts in which malice plays a secondary and 
contingent role, from those in which it forms an essential ingredient of the action: see A Ripstein, Private Wrongs 
(Cambridge, Mass 2016) ch  6.  
3 See, eg, WE Ormsby, “Malice in the Law of Torts” (1892) 8 LQR 140, 149: “[t]he cases in which [malice is essential are] 
… exceptional, and … anomalous”; E Chamberlain, “Misfeasance in a Public Office: A Justifiable Anomaly within the 
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doubts about credibility. Secondly, those who cry “anomaly” give no indication of what the benchmark 
is against which such an accusation may be measured. Since torts are highly heterogeneous – in terms 
of their liability bases,4 their remedies5 and their structure6 – it is far from clear what it might mean to 
say that a tort is anomalous. Thirdly, even supposing that the benchmark is some or other theoretical 
understanding of tort law (and the torts in question are described as anomalous because they clash 
with that theory), it by no means follows that we should afford great weight to the claim that they are 
anomalous. It is one thing for a senior, appellate court judge to describe a rule of law as an anomaly, 
but quite another matter if the claim is made purely by a jurist. Put otherwise, jurists who produce 
grand theories of tort are sometimes minded to say that tort x is an anomaly simply because it does 
not fit their theory. But this does not mean that we must accept that tort x is an anomaly because it 
clashes with a certain theory when it has been endorsed repeatedly at the highest judicial level.7   
Without any clear idea of what is meant by “anomaly”, we are left only with the vague suggestion 
that these torts are all unusual in some unspecified way. Perhaps it is thought they are aberrations: 
torts that are unnecessary and which should never have been created?  Perhaps it means no more than 
that they are each, for some or other reason, unique? But what if they are not anomalous in either of 
these ways? What if, taken together, they form an important and possibly growing subset of tort law? 
If that be so, then there is a strong case for seeking to understand them better; to work out why malice 
forms a touchstone of liability within them bearing in mind the fact that, since Allen v Flood,8 it has 
generally been thought that malice is not a suitable peg on which to hang tortious liability if the act in 
question is not otherwise wrongful. 
That the four torts just named cannot seriously be thought to be anomalous in the first of the 
two senses mentioned is easy enough to show. Each of them has had its vitality confirmed by our 
most senior judges in the last twenty years or so. The misfeasance tort and lawful means conspiracy 
were both fortified – perhaps even rescued from obsolescence9 – by landmark decisions of the House 
of Lords in the first decade of the twenty-first century.10 Malicious prosecution received a significant 
boost when, in 2016, its scope was extended11 to cases of the malicious pursuit of civil actions in Willers 
                                                 
Rights-Based Approach?” in D Nolan and A Robertson (eds) Rights and Private Law (Oxford 2012); Lonrho Ltd v Shell 
Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173, 188 “conspiracy is a highly anomalous cause of action” (Lord Diplock); Crawford 
Adjusters Ltd v Sagicor Insurance Ltd [2014] AC 366, [145]: “malicious prosecution is in modern conditions an anomalous 
tort” (Lord Sumption).  
4 The liability bases of torts vary from strict liability to torts requiring intention. Yet others require fault of a kind that falls 
short of intentional wrongdoing.  
5 Various, relatively rare remedies – such as quia timet injunctions, gain-based damages, aggravated damages and exemplary 
damages – are available in tort law. Furthermore, they are sometimes available in respect of a handful of torts when the 
the usual tort remedy of compensatory damages is not available. For a full exposition of the remedial heterogeneity of tort 
law (and the absence of a default remedy which unifies torts), see J Murphy, “The Heterogeneity of Tort Law” (2019) 39 
OJLS (forthcoming). 
6 Most torts are bilaterally structured. Some economic torts require that C strike at D by committing a civil wrong against 
an intermediary, T. These torts include the unlawful means tort, malicious falsehood and passing off. Dependency claims 
under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, claims under the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 and claims against 
employers based on vicarious liability, all fit this tripartite structure, too. 
7 For a trenchant attack on theorists who with little reflection condemn as anomalous or wrong appellate court decisions, 
see J Stapleton, ‘Taking the Judges Seriously’ https://ox.cloud.panopto.eu/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=c43ce0fc-
7623-47ec-a1e8-a8cf0099a581. 
8 [1898] AC 1. 
9 See, eg, Davis v Bromley [1908] 1 KB in which the Court of Appeal denied the existence of the misfeasance tort. 
10 See Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 (misfeasance tort; House of Lords); Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] 1 AC 1174 and JSC BTA Bank v Khrapunov [2018] UKSC 19 (lawful means 
conspiracy; House of Lords). 
11 Lord Toulson was clear that the question before the court was whether “the [existing] tort of malicious prosecution 
includes the prosecution of civil proceedings” (italics added). Cf J Goudkamp “A Tort is Born” [2017] NLJ 11. 
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v Joyce.12 And its sibling – abuse of process – was also regarded by the Privy Council as an extant tort 
“distinct from malicious prosecution” just a few years ago.13 On the basis of these decisions, each of 
these actions can defensibly be said to have a proper place in the modern compendium of torts. Such 
weighty judicial endorsement certainly undermines the idea that they are on the wane, and probably 
also undermines the suggestion that they were erroneously created in a bygone age.14  
The claim that they are anomalous in the other sense – that is, unique causes of action – is not so 
easily rebuffed. True, there is an obvious link between abuse of process and malicious prosecution, 
but these two torts have no obvious connection to either the misfeasance tort or lawful means 
conspiracy (which torts, in turn, have no apparent connection with each other). If there is a link 
between the four torts, then it lies beneath the surface. This article seeks to excavate that link. It aims 
to show that they share a common conception of malice,15 and that this conception of malice explains 
their raison d’être.  
Part II of this article is prefatory. It explains why only the four torts highlighted need concern us 
even though they are not the only ones in which malice can play a dispositive role. More particularly, 
it suggests that within the four named torts proof of malice is always required in order to substantiate a 
claim whereas in other torts its role is both contingent and subsidiary. Part III aims to unpick the 
various conceptions of malice found within the four torts over the last few centuries and to distil from 
among these a single, common, modern conception of malice that may plausibly be said to be at work 
in all of them. So doing has the merit of showing consistency in the law.16 Part IV attends to the most 
important issue of all: the normative question of whether malice ever ought to ground liability in tort. Part 
V draws things to a close with a number of concluding remarks. 
 
 
II. Torts in which Malice is a Necessary Ingredient 
 
As the name of the tort suggests, malice is crucial to the imposition of liability for “malicious 
prosecution”. In addition – although the need for malice is sometimes expressed via various synonyms 
– the general view is that malice also comprises an essential element in the torts of abuse of process,17 
misfeasance in a public office and lawful means conspiracy. In all four actions, malice may fairly be 
described as a discrete touchstone of liability, although arguably this is only obvious in the case of 
malicious prosecution.18 In the other three torts, the fact that malice is an essential ingredient requires 
some unearthing.  
                                                 
12 [2016] 3 WLR 477. 
13 Crawford (n 3) [62] (Lord Wilson).  
14 It is in theory possible that they were not needed when originally created, but that they have become necessary since. But 
there is no hint of this in any of the cases.  
15 Most writers who have tackled the meaning of malice acknowledge the confusion surrounding this term: see, eg, FH 
Newark, “Malice in Actions on the Case for Words” (1944) 60 LQR 366; 366-7; Ormsby (n 2) 140-144; WL Prosser, 
“Injurious Falsehood: The Basis of Liability” (1959) 59 Col L Rev 425, 428-430.  
16 Since consistency is tied closely to the dignity of the law, there is obvious virtue in consistency. Also, such commonality 
between the torts helps undermine the claim that they are anomalies.  
17 Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing (NC) 212, 224 (Bosanquet J): “[t]he action is … for maliciously abusing the process of the 
court”. In Gilding v Eyre (1861) 10 CB NS 592, 604 (Willes J): D liable for having “maliciously employed the process of the 
court”.  
18 See, eg, Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726, 765; Willers (n 12) [54]. 
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In the tort of lawful means conspiracy, the malice requirement is typically expressed in terms of 
the defendant having acted with the predominant purpose of harming the claimant.19 Even so, we will 
see in Part III why the predominant purpose requirement in that tort can be treated as synonymous 
with the need to show malice. In the case of both misfeasance in a public office and abuse of process, 
the malice requirement also requires some excavation. According to the leading case of Three Rivers 
DC v Bank of England (No 3),20 there are two forms of the misfeasance tort. Only in the definition of 
the first of these is the need for malice spelled out. As Lord Steyn explained, this version is committed 
where there is “targeted malice by a public officer, i.e. conduct specifically intended to injure a person 
or persons” with accompanying “bad faith in the sense of the exercise of public power for an improper 
or ulterior motive”.21 In the definition of the second form, there is no overt mention of a need for 
malice. Lord Steyn said merely that, in this guise, the tort is committed by “a public officer [who] acts 
knowing that he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the 
plaintiff”.22 True, he was quick to add that this form of the tort also “involves bad faith”.23 But it is by 
no means obvious that his appendage of the need for bad faith was intended to render the second 
version of the tort one that also required malice. This is, however, how I think we ought to regard it. 
As was explained in one notable Australian case, the public officer who acts with bad faith has 
necessarily acted “in the absence of an honest attempt to perform the functions of the office”.24 And, 
as Deane J spelled out in that same case, acting with deliberate or reckless disregard for the proper 
limits of one’s powers is tantamount to malice in this tort so long as resulting injury or loss is 
foreseeable. As he put it:  
 
[t]he requirement of malice … [is] satisfied if the act was done with knowledge of invalidity or lack 
of power and with knowledge that it would cause or be likely to cause such injury. Finally, malice will 
exist if the act is done with reckless indifference or deliberate blindness to that invalidity or lack of 
power and that likely injury.25 
    
Abuse of process is also a tort in which malice is key. But just as with lawful means conspiracy and 
the misfeasance tort, the leading cases reveal the use of various terms that are intended as synonyms 
or surrogates for malice. The classic explanation of abuse of process was supplied in Grainger v Hill in 
which it was said that the tort is animated by a defendant’s abuse of “the process of the law … to 
effect an object not within the scope of the process”.26 There, the defendant had sued the claimant 
for debt (even though the sum owed was not due to be paid for another 10 months). Tindal CJ was 
adamant not only that the claimant had available “an action for abusing the process of the law, by 
applying it to extort property from the Plaintiff” but also that this was “not an action for a malicious 
                                                 
19 See, eg, Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co v Veitch [1942] AC 435, 445. There are a few cases in which the need to show 
malice has been stated expressly: see, eg, Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495, 512 (Lord Shand): “combination … in pursuit 
merely of a malicious purpose to injure another would be clearly unlawful”.   
20 [2003] 2 AC 1. 
21 ibid 191. Cf Ripstein (n 2) 182-3 (seeking to portray the malice requirement in this tort as being about D’s means and 
not D’s ends, yet invoking only the rather dated case of Roncarelli v Duplessis [1959] SCR 121 and not the modern definition 
of the tort in Three Rivers). 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid. 
24 Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 357. 
25 ibid, 370. In this jurisdiction it has been held that “[w]here a Judge of an inferior court, acting within his powers, from 
corrupt motives gives a wrong decision, malice is the foundation of any action against him”: Ferguson v Kinnoull (1842) 9 Cl & 
F 251, 321 (Lord Cottenham) (emphasis added). See also the dictum of Lord Clarke in Willers (reproduced below in the 
text accompanying (n 81)).  
26 (1838) 4 Bing (NC) 212, 221 (Tindal CJ). 
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arrest or malicious prosecution”.27 Central to the difference, he said, was the fact that in cases of abuse 
of process, “it is immaterial whether the suit which that process commenced has been determined or 
not, or whether or not it was founded on reasonable and probable cause”.28  
By contrast with the four torts just considered, malice is not an essential ingredient in two further 
torts in which it nonetheless sometimes features as a relevant consideration. In both private nuisance and 
defamation, malice plays a role that is both contingent and secondary. By contingent, what I mean is 
that the relevance of malice will depend upon the facts. For certain torts, the issue of whether D acted 
maliciously is not a precondition of liability, though if it happens to be present it will be relevant to 
deciding the case. By secondary role, what I mean is that malice does not, per se, comprise a free-
standing touchstone of liability. It serves only to illuminate whether some other consideration, which 
is in fact key, has been satisfied. It may shed light on whether a specific touchstone of liability has 
been met, or it may indicate whether the defendant should be denied a particular defence.29  
The contingent and secondary role of malice in private nuisance is readily demonstrated. It plays 
a contingent role in that its relevance in nuisance cases is exceptional,30 requiring unusual facts to be 
present. Indeed, the instances in which it has proved pertinent are – despite their relative fame – 
remarkably few in number. Why, though, do I claim that its role is merely secondary on such 
occasions? The answer is this: malice has no independent juridical significance in such cases. It is 
simply a factor that illuminates the genuinely fundamental question of whether the defendant caused 
an unreasonable interference. In Christie v Davey, North J made clear that he “was persuaded that what 
was done by the defendant was done only for the purpose of annoyance, and …[was therefore] not a 
legitimate use of the defendant’s house.”31 Expressed more succinctly, the defendant’s malice rendered 
his user of his land unreasonable (which in turn, and critically, rendered the interference caused to his 
neighbour an unreasonable one). As Frederick Pollock put it, the fact that one is deliberately annoying 
a neighbour “may be relevant to show that the defendant is not using his property in an ordinary and 
legitimate way such as good neighbours mutually tolerate”.32 Ultimately, liability attached to the 
unreasonableness of the interference caused rather than the defendant’s malice per se. In line with 
orthodoxy, malice was not treated as an independent ingredient of liability.33 
Similar analysis can be applied to the role of malice in the law of defamation. It is has a merely 
contingent role there in that questions of whether the defendant was actuated by malice will only be 
addressed in a limited number of cases: specifically, those in which a defence of qualified privilege or 
honest comment is invoked. And just as in private nuisance, the presence of malice has a merely 
secondary role to play because malice simply sheds light on the genuinely fundamental question of 
                                                 
27 ibid. 
28 ibid. Note, however, that in common with malicious prosecution, abuse of process has at its core “civil proceedings 
brought … maliciously and without any proper justification”: Willers (n 12) [62] (Lord Clarke).    
29 I don’t deny that malice may ultimately be the determining factor. My point is merely that malice has no independent 
significance as an element of the tort that must always be shown in cases of this kind. 
30 See, eg, Christie v Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316, 326; Followed in Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468.  These 
cases are in no way undermined by Bradford Corporation v Pickles [1895] AC 587, for in that case claimant had no right to 
receive the flow of water obstructed by defendant. In both Christie v Davie and the Hollywood Silver Fox farm case the 
claimants had rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their land that were affected by the defendant’s malicious conduct.  
31 ibid 327.   
32 F Pollock, The Law of Torts 7th ed (London 1904) 400.  
33 Pollock believed firmly in principle that “[e]very one commits a wrong who harms another … by an act intended to cause 
harm” (F Pollock, The Law of Torts 2nd ed (London 1890) 52), yet he was forced to admit in the wake of the decision in 
Pickles (n 30) that although there had been some doubt (following Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow and Co [1892] 
AC 25) whether English law embraced the idea that malice could ground liability, he conceded after the decision in Pickles 
that no such doubt could henceforth be maintained. For discussion of Pollock’s earlier commitment to what in the USA 
is called the prima facie tort doctrine, and his gradual acceptance that that doctrine did not form part of English Law, see 
N Duxbury, Frederick Pollack and the English Juristic Tradition (Oxford 2004) 271-279.  
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whether the particular defence is available.34 That malice is not a general touchstone of liability in 
defamation is clear from Lord Bramwell’s well-known remark that, “[a] man may be the publisher of 
a libel without a particle of malice or improper motive”.35    
A final tort in which the role of malice needs to be cleared up is that of malicious falsehood. In 
this tort malice does not mean spite, ill-will or even anything close to that. Rather, mere knowledge 
of, or recklessness as to, the falsity of the statement in question will suffice.36 Put more simply, 
malicious falsehood is concerned with dishonest misrepresentations rather than with defendants 
actuated by malice in the accepted sense. The tort is a closer companion of deceit and passing off than 
the four torts with which this article is concerned. Much of the confusion generated by the label 
“malicious falsehood” could be avoided if its alternative name, “injurious falsehood”, were generally 
preferred.37   
 
What this section has suggested is that malice (or some synonym for malice) is only plausibly an 
essential ingredient in the four torts identified above.38 The qualifier “plausibly” is needed because 
whether malice is in truth required in all of them depends on whether various pivotal phrases that one 
finds used in certain cases deserve to be treated as synonyms for malice. It is to this awkward question 
of teasing out the precise legal connotation of malice that we must now turn.    
 
 
III. Unearthing a Unitary Conception of Malice 
 
A.  The Theoretical Importance of a Unitary Conception 
Attempts at discovering a precise meaning of malice (qua touchstone of liability) in tort law have been 
thin on the ground over the last half century or so.39 Quite why this should be the case is unclear given 
that malice has been central to the disposition of many tort cases over several centuries.40  
Early studies reveal that its legal meaning has varied very considerably, not just between torts, but 
also within a single tort, over time, from one case to the next. Indeed, according to Fridman, there has 
been such variable use of the term malice that “there must be judicial authority for any or almost any 
meaning that a writer wishes to attribute to the word”.41 And mindful of this, Lord Mance in Willers 
                                                 
34 See Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 CM & R 181, 193 (qualified privilege); Defamation Act 2013, s 3 (honest comment). 
35 Abrath v NE Ry (1886) 11 App Cas 247, 253. 
36 Wilts United Dairies v Robinson [1957] RPC 200, 226-7 (Stable J). The Court of Appeal affirmed Stable J’s decision and 
held that even a misrepresentation by conduct would suffice: Wilts United Dairies v Robinson [1958] RPC 99, 101 (Morris 
LJ). 
37 Salmond used the label “injurious falsehood” first: J Salmond, Torts (London 1907) 149. Others who continue to use it 
include A Beever, A Theory of Tort Liability (Oxford 2016) 171; P Cane, “Mens Rea in Tort Law” (2000) 20 OJLS 533, 539; 
Newark (n 15) 376; Prosser (n 15). 
38 Cf Beever (n 37) 132-4. 
39 In the present era, the most sustained treatment belongs to Arthur Ripstein. However, he is not specifically concerned 
to discover a single meaning of malice across several torts. He attends mainly to the role of malice in private nuisance. He 
argues principally that malice should be understood in terms of D’s means and not D’s ends: see Ripstein (n 2) 168-9.  
There is also some treatment of malice in J Finnis, “Intention in Tort Law” in DG Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of 
Tort Law (Oxford 1995). 
40 As Lord Toulson observed in Willers ((n 12), [52]): “over the last 400 years there has been a volume of case law about 
malice”. His speech offers a sizeable trawl of the malicious prosecution and abuse of process cases going back to the 
seventeenth century cases of Waterer v Freeman (1618) Hob 266 and Atwood v Monger (1653) Style 378. 
41 GHL Fridman, “Malice in the Law of Torts” (1958) 21 MLR 484, 484. See also WE Ormsby, “Malice in the Law of 
Torts” (1892) 8 LQR 140; LC Krauthoff, “Malice as an Ingredient of a Civil Cause of Action” (1898) 21 Annual Report of 
the American Bar Association 335. 
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treated the historic slipperiness of the concept as a reason not to extend the tort of malicious 
prosecution to the malicious pursuit of civil proceedings.42  
Fridman, however, overstated the true position. The relevant case law reveals just four main 
conceptions of malice that have been used in the torts that concern us.43 But there the simplification 
of our task ends, for there are not four separate conceptions, each one applying uniquely to its own 
tort. Rather, there are four different conceptions in total, but multiple meanings of malice can 
sometimes be found at work within any one of our four key torts: while some cases of malicious 
prosecution suggest that malice means x, there are others that suggest it means y.  
Now, it is clearly unsatisfactory for there to be no settled concept of malice within any single tort. 
The rule of law principle that like cases must be treated alike requires as much. So, as Neil MacCormick 
explains:  
 
however desirable on consequentialist grounds a given ruling might be, it may not be adopted if it is 
contradictory of some … [extant] binding rule … [Thus] the requirement for consistency would 
require rejection of an otherwise attractive ruling on the ground of its irresoluble conflict with [an 
established rule].44 
 
Put more concretely, whatever the appeal of giving malice meaning x within a given case of, say, 
malicious prosecution, there is no legitimate warrant for adopting this meaning when malice has 
already been given meaning y in some previous case that has precedential weight. 
The desirability of a unitary conception of malice does not end there, however, for there is an 
equally strong case for a single meaning of malice to be employed across all of the four torts in which 
it is an ingredient of liability. The argument here is not based on the need for consistency in 
adjudication, but, instead, upon the value of the law’s coherence. As MacCormick again explains:  
 
‘Coherence’ is intended in a looser sense [than consistency]. One can imagine a random set of norms 
none of which contradict each other but which taken together involve the pursuit of no intelligible 
value or policy. A trivial example: a rule that all yellow motor cars must observe a maximum speed 
limit of 20 … does not contradict or logically conflict with a rule that all red, green, or blue motor 
cars must observe … a maximum of 70 … But on the face of it, no principled reason can be given 
for such a difference.45 
 
It is, of course, possible for malice to be given one meaning within, say, the tort of lawful means 
conspiracy and another meaning within the tort of malicious prosecution without any inconsistency. 
In lawful means conspiracy, Rule A might require the claimant to prove malice meaning x. By contrast, 
and quite separately, in malicious prosecution Rule B might require the claimant to show malice 
meaning y. But incoherence would follow. Although strictly speaking Rule A does not contradict Rule 
B, the coexistence of these two rules serves to distort a certain core principle or value of the wider 
legal system. In the same way that variable speed limits based on car colour would fail harmoniously 
to subserve a common value (such as environmental protection, or road safety), so, too, would two 
different rules on malice cause confusion as to the type of conduct that the law is seeking to address.  
Such confusion can be avoided if a unitary meaning of malice is applied across the board. To see 
why, let us assume for now – though this conception will be defended later – that that what links our 
                                                 
42 Willers (n 12) [137]-[140]. 
43 These, discussed fully in Section III B below, are malice qua (i) spite or ill-will; (ii) intention to do a wrongful and harmful 
act; (iii) acting without just (or reasonable and probable) cause; (iv) acting with improper motives.   




four torts is the abuse of public powers.46 In each tort, the claimant would have to show malicious 
abuse of such a power. But if malicious were to mean spiteful in one tort, while some lesser notion of 
malice animated another, we would be left wondering what common value was subserved by making 
malice a touchstone of liability in these torts. There ought to be a common reason for making the 
malicious doing of M a tort and for making the malicious doing of N a tort where both M and N are 
abuses of public power. Yet such a value would be obscured if different conceptions of a malicious 
abuse of public power were simultaneously in play. The law would appear not just incoherent, but also 
arbitrary.47  
Suppose for example, that a public officer were, on a single occasion, to abuse his powers so as 
to create the possibility of being sued either for abuse of process or for misfeasance in a public office. 
In such a case, the law would invite ridicule if the single act in question could be described as malicious 
for the purposes of the former, but not for the latter. The problem of incoherence/arbitrariness is a 
serious one, and Lord Sumption was rightly attentive to it in his dissenting speech in Willers.48  
In short, there is a strong theoretical case – grounded in a concern for consistency and coherence 
in the law – for having a unitary conception of malice both within and across all of the torts in which 
it forms a touchstone of liability. So, bearing in mind the present ambition to provide a better 
understanding of these torts, we must now endeavour to unearth whether any such unitary conception 
of malice can be found. If it can, we will be well on our way to discovering their raison d’être, and will 
also have to hand an obvious response for those who consider these torts to be anomalous or sui 
generis causes of action. 
 
 
B. The Interpretative Case for a Unitary Conception of Malice 
As noted already, four main conceptions of malice have appeared over the years in the case law 
associated with the torts considered in this article. According to the most obvious of these 
conceptions, malice is (as in common parlance) a synonym for spite or ill-will. There are certainly 
some early cases in which this meaning was applied. In Hicks v Faulkner – a malicious prosecution case 
– it was suggested that “[t]he malice necessary to be established is … malice in fact – malus animus – 
indicating that the party was actuated by spite or ill-will towards an individual”.49 Since then, however, 
the courts have made clear on many other occasions that malice is not to be construed so narrowly. 
Indeed, modern cases seem universally to reject this construction. Among them is the recent Privy 
Council decision in Crawford Adjustors v Sagicor General Insurance.50 Given the modern tendency not to 
adopt the common parlance interpretation,51 it seems appropriate to dismiss the idea that, within in 
our four torts, malice means spite or ill-will.  
A second meaning of malice was that adopted by Bowen LJ in the landmark case of Mogul 
Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Others, namely, that it “means and implies an intention to do an 
                                                 
46 For three accounts that come close to this, see EJ Weinrib, “Two Conceptions of Remedies” in CEF Rickett (ed), 
Justifying Private Law Remedies (Oxford 2008) 29; Beever (n 37) 173; Ripstein (n 2) 182-3.  
47 Beever, more charitably, calls the problem one of limited rationality: A Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford 
2007) 22.   
48 Willers (n 12) [178].  
49 (1881) 8 QBD 167, 175. An additional construction, though, was malice as “indirect or improper motives”: ibid. 
50 [2013] UKPC 17, [72] (Lord Wilson): “the concept extends beyond spite”: ibid [72]. 
51 McCardie J summed things up neatly observing: “the jurist … enlarged the layman’s notion of malice”: Pratt v BMA 
[1919] 1 KB 244, 275-6. Other judges keen to distinguish the legal and everyday meanings of malice include Bowen LJ 
(“[t]he terms ‘maliciously’, ‘wrongfully’, and ‘injure’ are words all of which have accurate meanings, well known to the law, 
but which also have a popular and less precise signification”: Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Others (1889) 23 
QBD 598, 612) and Bayley J (distinguishing the legal meaning of malice and “[m]alice, in common acceptation”: Bromage 
v Prosser (1825) 4 B & C 247, 255). 
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act that is wrongful to the detriment of another”.52 It is a formulation that has its origins in the tort of 
malicious falsehood, and at least one attempt has been made to apply it to the tort of abuse of process. 
That attempt failed,53 and the Supreme Court has since also shown itself unwilling to adopt this 
meaning in the context of malicious prosecution.54 Since there is no evidence that it has ever been 
considered relevant to the other two torts with which we are concerned – and since malice thus 
understood is in any case redundant as a touchstone of liability55 – we can also dismiss this construction 
of malice. 
A third contender for the unitary meaning of malice is that of acting without just (or reasonable 
and probable) cause. The idea that acting in this way could be synonymous with malice might be 
thought to follow from Parke J having said in Mitchell v Jenkins that “in every action for a malicious 
prosecution … when there is no reasonable or probable cause, it is for the jury to infer malice from 
the facts proved”.56 But any such notion that the two ideas should be treated as co-terminous must be 
rejected for at least four reasons. To begin with, Parke J’s words are directed to the matter of how 
evidence is acquired rather than to a particular legal concept.57 Secondly, the Supreme Court was aware 
of this third possible interpretation in Willers yet steadfastly refused to accept it. Lord Toulson stated 
emphatically that “the requirements of absence of reasonable and probable cause and malice are 
separate requirements although they may be entwined”.58 Thirdly, malice is a matter that relates to the 
mindset of the defendant whereas a lack of reasonable cause is an empirical fact in the world. Fourthly, 
although the two issues often overlap, it is important to realise that they can also come apart quite 
markedly. For example, as Scrutton LJ observed in Greers Ltd v Pearman & Corder Ltd, an “[h]onest 
belief in an unfounded claim is not malice”59 and yet the case would be one with no reasonable cause.   
The fourth possible meaning of malice – namely, malice construed as an improper or bad motive 
– is altogether more promising in terms of providing our golden thread. Indeed, I would suggest that 
it is the conception of malice that is either overtly or impliedly used in each the four torts with which 
we are concerned.  
In lawful means conspiracy, the courts overtly anchor a defendant’s liability to a bad motive.60 
(And here I adopt the accepted view of motive as “the reason why one engages in the conduct”61 in 
question.) Talk of bad motive appears repeatedly in the various opinions delivered in the landmark 
case of Quinn v Leathem;62 and it is clear from the way that the terms “bad motive” and “malice” were 
used interchangeably that in that case that they were seen as synonyms. Lord Shand, for example, 
stated generally that “combination … in pursuit merely of a malicious purpose to injure another, would 
be clearly unlawful”63 before going on to explain that such malicious purposes were to be discovered 
                                                 
52 Above (n 51), 612. 
53 Jacob v Vockrodt [2007] BPIR 1568. 
54 Willers (n 12) [55]. Lord Toulson specifically pointed out that it had been used in “the early cases” and referred to it as 
“the nineteenth century understanding of the word malicious”: ibid. 
55 The redundancy inheres in the fact that, in this “malice in law” construction, the malice adds nothing to the question of 
liability: it is merely evidence of, or synonymous with, intent to commit an act that is already wrongful. It could, however, be 
relevant to the question of whether aggravated damages should be awarded. 
56 In similar vein, see Waterer v Freeman (1792) 80 ER 352, 352; Wren v Weild (1869) LR 4 QB 730, 736. 
57 On the idea that inferences ordinarily pertain to factual matters rather than have any bearing on conceptually tricky legal 
ingredients, see R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82 (intent in criminal law only to be inferred exceptionally: from D’s foresight of 
a virtually certain outcome).  
58 [2016] 3 WLR 477 [54]. See also Glinski v McIvor [1962] AC 726, 765. 
59 (1922) 3 RPC 406, 417. Equally, “if there be reasonable or probable cause, no malice, however distinctly proved, will 
make the defendant liable”: Mitchell v Jenkins (1833) 5 B & Ad 588, 594. 
60 In cases of mixed motives, it is D’s predominant motive that must meet this description: Crofter (n 19) at 445. 
61 Cane (n 37) 539. 
62 [1901] AC 495. 
63 ibid 512. 
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in the defendant’s improper motives.64 Equally, although elsewhere in his speech Lord Halsbury spoke 
a good deal about the defendant’s motives, he was adamant from the outset that the action for lawful 
means conspiracy turned, ultimately, on whether the defendants had acted “in pursuance of a 
conspiracy formed among them …. and that all this was done with malice”.65 Lord Lindley, too, spoke 
of acting “maliciously in the sense of proceeding from a bad motive”.66   
In the later House of Lords’ case of Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Company Ltd v Veitch, Lord 
Porter likewise aligned malice with motive saying that there could be liability for lawful means 
conspiracy “if one of the parties had no purpose but to vent his own vindictive spite and if the other 
knew of and countenanced that purpose by giving his assistance to the malicious acts of the first”.67 
Viscount Maugham, too, was clear that the problem of mixed motives in lawful means conspiracy 
cases requires a court to weigh the fact that “what the defendants had done was done with malice” 
against the observation that “one at least of the motives actuating the defendant was the benefit [to 
themselves or others]”.68  All in all, then, despite some vacillation in the cases between talk of “malice”, 
“bad faith”, “bad motive” and “improper purposes”, it seems tolerably clear that the leading cases 
bear out Cane’s general observation that, “[i]n tort law, bad motives are referred to as ‘malice’”.69 
In the tort of abuse of process, malice again appears in the guise of an improper purpose (or bad 
motive) requirement. In Grainger v Hill,70 where the defendant abused the legal process in order to gain 
possession of property to which he knew he was not entitled, Bosanquet J set out the basis of the 
action. He said that the tort is committed where “the process [of the court] was enforced for an ulterior 
purpose; to obtain property by duress to which the Defendants had no right” and that, unlike 
malicious prosecution, “the action is not for maliciously putting process in force, but for maliciously 
abusing the process of the court”.71  In similar vein, Tindall CJ said that the tort could be invoked 
where “the process of the law has been abused, to effect an object not within the scope of the 
process”.72 So, as with lawful means conspiracy, the idea of malice qua improper motive clearly 
undergirds the tort of abuse of process.   
In the misfeasance tort, the role of improper motive was spelled out in the first few pages of Lord 
Steyn’s leading speech in the Three Rivers case. Before listing the exact ingredients of the tort, he made 
clear, quoting Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, that “the tort of misfeasance in a public office is an exception 
to ‘the general rule that … if conduct is lawful apart from motive, a bad motive will not make … [one] 
liable’”.73 He then set out the two versions of the tort that we noted earlier. In relation to the first of 
these, the idea that malice should be understood in terms of improper motive could scarcely have 
been expressed more clearly. Lord Steyn specifically dubbed it the “targeted malice” version before 
explaining its operation in terms of “the exercise of public power for an improper or ulterior motive”.74 
That the second version also requires malice qua bad faith (and therefore improper motive75) was also 
made clear:  
 
                                                 
64 He said of the defendants in Quinn that “[t]heir acts were wrongful and malicious … [since] they acted by conspiracy… 
for the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff in his trade”: ibid 515.   
65 ibid 506. 
66 ibid 533. 
67 ibid 495. 
68 ibid 452. 
69 Cane (n 37) 539. 
70 (1838) 4 Bing NC 212. 
71 ibid 224. 
72 ibid 221. 
73 Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Co of the Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1, 190.  
74 ibid 191. 
75 For Lord Steyn’s linking together bad faith and improper motive, see above (n 21). 
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a public officer acts knowing that he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will 
probably injure the plaintiff. It involves bad faith inasmuch as the public officer does not have an 
honest belief that his act is lawful.76  
 
The malice in play here is not the targeted malice that animates the first version, but rather a kind of 
malice that Peter Cane has labelled “collateral malice”. This collateral malice involves the defendant 
using a privilege or power “for some purpose other than that for which … [it] is given”.77 Any public 
officer who knowingly uses his powers for purposes other than those for which they were conferred 
cannot but be said to be acting in bad faith.78 And because her act has not the remotest colour of being 
used for a proper purpose, it may fairly also be described as malicious even though the officer bore the 
claimant no specific ill-will.  
There is certainly weighty judicial support for the idea that acts falling within this second version 
of the tort should be regarded as malicious. In the Three Rivers case, in addition to Lord Steyn having 
said as much,79 Lord Hutton also insisted that “the second limb of the tort is a species of malice”.80 
Only slightly more guardedly, Lord Clarke said in Willers that the second limb of the misfeasance tort 
is “close to the test of malice referred to in the wrongful arrest cases”.81 Jurists, too, are on record as 
holding the same view. Donal Nolan, for example, says of this second version of the misfeasance tort 
that “conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another” amounts to malice for legal 
purposes;82 while Jason Neyers has also argued that such acts are malicious insofar as the officer’s 
“primary purpose is not one that officer, to his or her knowledge is entitled to have”.83   
At the very least, equating bad faith in the misfeasance tort with malice qua improper motive 
ensures terminological consistency with lawful means conspiracy where, as noted earlier, precisely that 
meaning is ascribed to bad faith.84 
The idea that improper motive is an appropriate way to understand malice in the tort of malicious 
prosecution is also readily shown. In Crawford, the defendant caused certain insurers in the Cayman 
Islands to sue the claimant for deceit and conspiracy to defraud. He did so with the express intention 
of driving the claimant out of business and ruining him professionally. When the case reached the 
Privy Council, Lord Kerr made the following observation: 
 
A good working definition of what is required for proof of malice in the criminal context [runs as 
follows]: … “to constitute malice, the dominant purpose of the prosecutor must be a purpose other 
than the proper invocation of the criminal law – an ‘illegitimate’ or oblique motive”. That improper 
purpose must be the sole or dominant purpose actuating the prosecutor.85 
 
He then added that “[t]here is no reason that proof of malice in the civil context should be any less 
stringent”.86 In Willers, Lord Toulson put it slightly differently. He said: “the claimant must prove … 
                                                 
76 [2003] 2 AC 1, 191. 
77 Cane (n 37) 539. 
78 In Three Rivers, Lord Steyn was clear that all public law powers can only legitimately be exercised for the public good: 
[2003] 2 AC 1 190. 
79 See above (n 21). 
80 Three Rivers (n 73) 224. 
81 Willers (n 12) 503. 
82 D Nolan, “A Public Law Tort: Understanding Misfeasance in a Public Office” in K Barker et al (eds), Private Law and 
Power (Oxford 2017) 197 (citing Ferguson v Kinnoull (1842) 9 Cl & F 251, 321).  
83 JW Neyers, “Explaining the Inexplicable? Four Manifestations of Abuse of Rights in English Law” in Nolan and 
Robertson (n 3) 320. 
84 Crofter (n 19) at 483 and 495 (Lords Porter and Simon). 
85 [2013] UKPC 17 [109]. 
86 ibid [110]. 
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that the defendant did not have a bona fide reason to bring the proceedings”.87 This of course raises 
the question of what is meant by bringing an action without a bona fide purpose. And on that question 
his Lordship thought an action could be so regarded if the defendant were to “bring the proceedings 
… to secure some extraneous benefit to which he has no colour of right’.88 The talk of purposes, of course, makes 
clear that, like Lord Kerr in Crawford, Lord Toulson was ultimately concerned to attach liability to 
those who institute civil proceedings with an improper motive. And in so doing, he was bringing the 
meaning of malice in this tort into line with a number of earlier cases in which malice had been thus 
conceived. For example, in Hall v Semple (where the claimant alleged that the defendant had maliciously 
caused him to be detained in custody as a person of unsound mind), Crompton J held that ‘[m]alice 
does not mean merely spite, but any improper motive.89  
 
This section has explained that, although four different meanings have malice have appeared at various 
times (and with varying degrees of regularity) in the case law associated with the torts with which this 
article is concerned, only one such conception – malice qua bad or improper motives – can be seen at 
work in all four of those torts. It is by no means an obvious conception, and it also contrasts markedly 
with the meaning of malice in the criminal law setting where, historically, it featured prominently in 
the definition of various statutory crimes.90 Nonetheless, it is a meaning that we should accept. For 
not only is there weighty judicial support for equating malice with bad or improper motives in each of 
the four torts considered here, there is also a powerful theoretical case (based on coherence in the law) 
for so doing. Alternative constructions – such as malice qua spite – have for the most part been rejected 
by our most senior courts, and in any event (because they were never used in all four torts) these rival 
conceptions lack the capacity to unite the four torts in view in a way that renders the law coherent. 
What must now be considered is whether a plausible defence can be made in favour of treating malice 
as a touchstone of liability in tort.  
 
 
IV. The Merits of Malice as an Ingredient of Liability 
 
Showing that malicious prosecution, abuse of process, the misfeasance tort and lawful means 
conspiracy all operate according to a shared conception malice clearly helps to rebuff claims that one 
or more of these torts is a sui generis cause of action (in the sense that they are unique). Having a 
common ingredient allows each of them to be seen as part of a quartet with a common thread rather 
than as an anomalous one-off. At the same time, however, identifying this commonality does nothing 
to insulate these torts from the complaint that they undermine the value of coherence in the law of 
torts generally. Mindful of this, we might ask how malice can ever be tolerated as an ingredient of 
tortious liability given what the House of Lords has said numerous times about malice not converting 
ostensibly lawful acts into unlawful ones.  Even as a quartet, it is not obvious that we should regard 
the four torts in view as meritorious members of the tort law family. Any argument seeking to justify 
their existence must be made on independent grounds. The fact that one can advert to a number torts 
that share a common flaw does nothing to negate or ameliorate the fact that that flaw exists.  
                                                 
87 [2016] 3 WLR 477 [56]. 
88 ibid [55].  
89 (1862) 3 F & F 337, 357.  For several other examples, see Fridman (n 41) 484-5. 
90 A fair number of nineteenth century criminal law statutes required offences to be committed “maliciously”; and the 
Court of Criminal Appeal held that, “in any statutory definition of a crime ‘malice’ must be taken … as requiring either (1) 
an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done, or (2) recklessness as to whether such harm 
should occur”: R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396, 399 (Byrne J). The requirement that certain assaults be committed 
maliciously still features, unamended, in various sections of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.  
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A. Existing Arguments Concerning Malice as an Ingredient of Tortious Liability 
“It is a general rule of our law”, said Lord Herschell in Allen v Flood, “that an act prima facie lawful is 
not unlawful and actionable on account of the motive which dictated it”.91 This is probably the most 
frequently cited judicial statement against malice being treated as a touchstone of liability in tort. But 
it is not the only one. In the earlier case of Mayor of Bradford v Pickles, Lord Watson opined that “the 
existence of a bad motive, in the case of an act which is not in itself illegal, will not convert that act 
into a civil wrong”.92 These powerful statements, made by our most senior judges, are seemingly 
inconsistent with our four particular torts, all of which make malice an essential touchstone of 
liability.93 Yet resolving the apparent inconsistency is not impossible.  
To begin with, we may note that the law is in a constant process of development. Such ongoing 
development allows for what may at first appear to be blanket rules to give way to exceptions here 
and there. For example, the decision in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller94 marked an end to the idea that 
there could be no liability for misstatements outside the law of contract and the tort of deceit. In Derry 
v Peek, Lord Bramwell had laid down the apparently blanket rule that, where misstatements were 
concerned, “[t]o found an action for damages there must be a contract and breach, or fraud”.95 But 
Lord Reid, in his leading speech in Hedley Byrne, made clear that this should not be treated as an 
absolute rule. He said, clearly marking his departure from the received view, that  
 
[i]t must now be taken that Derry v Peek did not establish any universal rule that in the absence of 
contract an innocent but negligent misrepresentation cannot give rise to an action… We cannot, 
therefore, now accept as accurate the numerous statements to that effect in cases between 1889 and 
1914, and we must now determine the extent of the exceptions to that rule.96    
 
If we look again at what Lord Herschell said in Allen, we can see that his dictum also plainly allowed 
for exceptions. Notice how he was careful to preface what he said about motive’s inability to render 
unlawful what would otherwise be lawful.  He made absolutely clear the fact that he was enunciating 
only a “general rule”; and mere general rules always allow for exceptions. This, then, is how we may 
view the four torts considered in this article in that, in a departure from Lord Herschell’s general rule, 
they each make improper motives an essential ingredient of liability.97 Added to this is a third reason 
to treat with caution the idea that either Allen or Pickles laid down a blanket rule against tort liability 
being anchored to malice. It exists in the form of a broad reminder issued by Lord Halsbury in Quinn 
v Leathem about the inherent limits of rules of law, even when they are expressed in general terms. He 
warned that: 
 
[E]very judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, 
since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions 
                                                 
91 [1898] AC 1, 124. To like effect, Lord Davey said, “it seems to be an argument in a circle to say that an act not otherwise 
wrongful becomes so if malicious”: ibid 171. See also ibid 92 (Lord Watson) and Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum (No 2) [1982] 
AC 173, 188. 
92 [1895] AC 587, 592. He effectively reiterated the point in Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1, 92. 
93 Beever (n 2) 132-134 attempts such reconciliation. But his argument is undermined by his seeking to rely two different 
conceptions of malice that can supposedly be found in the case law. This approach is interpretively problematic since these 
putatively different meanings are drawn from cases that cite a common source.  
94 [1964] AC 465. 
95 (1889) 14 App Cas 337, 347. 
96 [1964] AC 465, 484. Similar doubts about Derry v Peek having established such a rule were expressed by Lord Devlin: 
ibid, 516. 
97 It might also be noted that Lord Herschell’s general rule was itself a dilution of the rule cast in seemingly absolute terms 
by Lord Watson in the Pickles case. 
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of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such 
expressions are found.98  
 
A fourth caveat belongs to John Finnis who regards the dicta in Allen v Flood and Bradford v Pickles just 
quoted as “gratuitous”.99 By this he means that they comprise judicial utterances that are conspicuously 
without proper foundations: they neither reveal, nor purport to be grounded in, any relevant 
precedents. In this he is assuredly right. What was said about the legal significance of malice in both 
of those cases was mere affirmation. Accordingly, we may justifiably question the extent to which they 
ever constituted a robust statement of the law. 
There is however a second objection to malice being treated as an ingredient of tort liability. It is 
based on pragmatic considerations. For all that Bowen LJ may have correctly observed that “the state 
of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion”,100 it is a fact, nonetheless, the 
ascertainment of which is fraught with difficulty. It is obviously harder to establish what a person is 
thinking than it is to assess the functionality of his gastric system. Thus, the objection goes, from the 
perspective of practical justice, requiring a claimant to prove the defendant’s motive places too much 
of a strain on the justice system, since it “plunges the courts into all sorts of difficulty…ascertaining 
people’s motives”.101 But is this right? For a start, the criminal law almost invariably requires proof of 
intent; so it might well be asked why proof of malice (on the balance of probabilities) in a civil law 
case is likely to create any such problem when proof of intent (beyond all reasonable doubt) in criminal 
law does not do so. Secondly, it is demonstrably the case that the four torts in which malice is a 
touchstone of liability are far from routinely invoked. Thus, although it is true that ascertaining a 
defendant’s motive can be problematic, the amount of work these torts generate for the courts must 
not be overstated. Thirdly, there is no evidence from those cases in which aggravated damages are 
sought (and in which motive is again a salient factor) that the courts, on such occasions, are placed 
under unmanageable strain. And fourthly, even if the need to prove malice does produce more work 
for the courts, it is nonetheless true, as Lord Toulson pointed out in Willers that “[e]xpenditure of 
court time is sometimes the public price of justice”.102 
Yet another objection to making malice an independent touchstone of liability is that its role in 
tort has already been settled: as a mere aggravating factor. A tortious act committed with malice is the 
type of act that is likely to infringe the claimant’s dignitary interest and thereby malice can be seen to 
ground an award of aggravated damages.103 This argument, however, suffers from the false assumption 
that a given factor proved in evidence can only have one function. Proof of intent, for example, might 
serve to ground both the existence of liability for battery and the ruling out of a plea of contributory 
negligence in such a case.104 
Changing tack, we might seek to distil a defence of the role of malice in the ascription of liability 
from the prima facie tort doctrine which has a firm foothold in the USA. According to this doctrine, 
any act that intentionally causes harm or is manifestly likely to cause it (and does so) is deemed to be 
                                                 
98 [1901] AC 495, 506. 
99 Finnis (n 39) 238. 
100 Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch 459, 483. 
101 NJ McBride and RM Bagshaw (London 2018) 659. 
102 Willers (n 12) [58]. 
103 According to Lord Devlin in the leading case on such damages “in cases where the damages are at large, the jury (or 
the judge if the award is left to him) can take into account the motives and conduct of the defendant where they aggravate 
the injury done to the plaintiff… [For] the wrong may be such as to injure the plaintiff’s proper feelings of dignity or 
pride” and “[t]hese are matters which the jury can take into account in assessing the appropriate compensation”: Rookes v 
Barnard [1964] 1129, 1221 For other such dicta, see J Murphy, “The Nature and Domain of Aggravated Damages” [2010] 
CLJ 353. 
104 Pritchard v Co-operative Group Ltd [2012] QB 320, [61]-[62]. 
15 
 
tortious in the absence of just cause. And since malicious acts (at least in the targeted sense) are highly 
likely to cause harm, they may fairly be deemed tortious by virtue of their augmented propensity to cause 
harm.105 There is, however, an obvious snag here: the fact that the prima facie tort doctrine is not part 
of English law. Thus, although this doctrine sheds some light on what may be thought normatively 
appealing about our four torts, it cannot, on the current state of English law, be invoked as a sound 
juridical justification for their existence.    
The exact same objection can be raised against another defence of malice (qua touchstone of 
liability) offered by John Finnis. He argues that, as a philosophical or moral matter, “[o]ne’s conduct 
will be right only if both one’s means and one’s end(s) are right”.106 But however much philosophy is 
on his side, the law as it stands is not.      
 
None of the arguments considered above offer a convincing case either for or against making malice 
a touchstone of liability. The cautionary notes sounded by Finnis and by Lord Halsbury cause us to 
doubt whether what was said in Allen v Flood was sound in the first place (even if it was in fact intended 
as blanket prohibition on the use of malice as an ingredient of tortious liability). Equally, worries 
concerning the evidential burden associated with the need to prove malice seem unconvincing when 
comparisons with the criminal law and the law on aggravated damages are borne in mind. Thirdly, the 
view that malice should be treated as an exclusively aggravating factor rests upon an assumption that 
is easily falsified. In the opposite direction, the prima facie tort doctrine only has a toehold in the USA, 
and Finnis’ desire to make malice a touchstone of liability has only philosophy (not precedent) to 
ground it.  
If malice is ever to be justified (or ruled out) as an ingredient of tortious liability, we must look 
elsewhere for the reason why. 
 
 
B. An Alternative Argument 
The best argument that can be made in support of making malice an ingredient of liability in our four 
torts is that it enables them to be used to address abuses of public (or, at least quasi-public) powers. 
In saying this, I must now explain what I mean by public power. Though nuanced differences exist 
between Hartian and Hofeldian conceptions of a power,107 both accounts accept that powers (as a 
general matter) involve an ability recognised by law to change the legal position of another. But 
whereas private powers include such things as the ability to sell one’s chattels, or establish a trust, or 
make a will, public powers are either those that are held exclusively by public officials or institutions108 
or those that are held by private individuals but pertain to the engagement of public officials or 
institutions (for example, by commencing legal proceedings).109 It is my submission that each of the 
                                                 
105 The increased probability stems from the fact that “the harm complained of was not only foreseen but intended”: OW 
Holmes, “Privilege, Malice and Intent” (1894) 8 Harv L Rev 1, 6. 
106 Finnis (n 39) 238. 
107 See A Halpin, “The Concept of a Legal Power” (1996) 16 OJLS 129.    
108 This is the conception of a public power adopted in K Barker, “Public Power, Discretion and the Duty of Care” in K 
Barker et al (eds), Private Law and Power (Oxford 2016) 207: “One of the key features of a public body … is that it is imbued 
with statutory powers that private individuals lack”. 
109 As explained more fully below, I consider the freedom of association that is integral to the tort of lawful means 
conspiracy a quasi-public power because the freedom involved is readily conceived in terms of a constitutional freedom 
to associate for communitarian purposes.  
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four torts with which this article is concerned can be understood in terms of the abuse of such powers 
even though it is often said that an abuse of rights principle is alien to the common law.110  
Since the misfeasance tort applies only to public officers who act in bad faith (and consequently 
for improper purposes), it can easily be seen in terms of an abuse of public power.111 Indeed, it offers 
the clearest example of all. For, as Arthur Ripstein observed, “[t]he defendant takes up what are 
supposed to be public powers and uses them against the plaintiff”.112 The torts of abuse of process 
and malicious prosecution can also be described in terms of the abuse of a public power. They involve 
an abuse of the right to access the Queens’s courts and the related legal machinery which animates 
both of these torts.113 Lord Steyn was clear in Gregory v Portsmouth City Council that a highly material 
consideration in malicious prosecution cases is that “the defendant has abused the coercive powers of 
the state”.114 His point is readily borne out by the fact that the vast majority of malicious prosecution 
cases are brought against the police.  
Lawful means conspiracy can also be explained in terms of an abuse of power that has a public 
rather than private dimension to it. McBride and Bagshaw – who also take the view that the other 
three torts can be seen in something like the terms suggested here – are markedly more hesitant about 
regarding lawful means conspiracy this way.115 Presumably, their hesitancy is attributable to the less 
than obvious public law – or perhaps more accurately, “quasi-public law”116 – power in play.    
Jason Neyers, however, is anything but hesitant about so doing. For him, lawful means conspiracy 
is “a classic example of an abuse of rights.”117 Unfortunately, Neyers relies on affirmation rather than 
argumentation. He fails to make clear the right that he thinks is being abused in such cases. He merely 
states that this action exists because “conspirators are violating a claim-right created by the system of 
rights”.118 He cites no case in support of this proposition but instead anchors his claim to Ernest 
Weinrib’s engagement with the abuse of rights issue. According to Weinrib, there is conceptual space 
for an abuse of rights principle in tort law for the following reason:  
 
[P]articipants in the system of rights are conceived as persons with a self-determining capacity for 
purposive action. Within this system each person pursues one’s [sic] self-chosen purposes, subject 
only to the constraint that one’s action be capable of coexisting with the purposiveness of others. 
This requires that one pursue one’s purposes as ends that one is trying to achieve for oneself, not as 
an obstacle against what someone else is trying to achieve… Accordingly, it would be inconsistent 
with what is normatively presupposed in the system of rights to allow a right to operate in a way that 
                                                 
110 Bradford v Pickles [1985] AC 587 is often cited in support of this proposition. However, the case is best understood 
differently. It turned not on the absence of an abuse of rights principle, but on the absence of a right held by C to receive the water 
percolating under D’s land: see McBride and Bagshaw (n 101) 450-51. 
111 Jason Neyers certainly takes this view, but he mistakenly says that the purpose of this tort is to ensure a “prohibition  
on the targeted infliction of gratuitous harm”: Neyers (n 83) 323. This characterisation of the misfeasance tort fails to 
capture many cases falling within version 2 for which targeted malice is not required.  
112 Ripstein (n 2) 182. See also S Todd, “Liability in Tort of Public Bodies” in N Mullany and A Linden (eds), Torts Tomorrow: 
A Tribute to John Fleming (North Ryde 1996). 
113 Martin v Watson [1996] AC 74, 88 (malicious prosecution); Hanrahan v Ainsworth [1990] 22 NSWLR 73, 120 (abuse of 
process). That access to the Queen’s courts is a constitutional right was made clear in Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und 
Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping [1981] AC 909. 
114 [2000] 1 AC 419, 426. See also Crawford (n 3) [134]-[135] (Lord Sumption). 
115 McBride and Bagshaw (n 101) 675. 
116 The term belongs to McBride and Bagshaw. They too suggest that malice prosecution, abuse of process and the 
misfeasance tort share the feature of an abuse of “public powers or quasi-public powers”: ibid (italics in the original).  The 
fail, however, to explain what they mean by the key term “public powers”. 
117Neyers (n 83) 323.  
118 ibid, 324. 
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would harm another without promoting (in the language of the civilians) a “serious and legitimate 
interest” of the right holder.119 
 
This analysis, however, is irrelevant to the claim made by Neyers. He, recall, thinks that the tort is 
about “conspirators violating a claim-right” held by the claimant.120 But the passage just cited is 
concerned with abuses of rights held by defendants to pursue their self-chosen purposes. If, like Neyers, 
we resort to Hohfeldian terminology, then the “right” with which Weinrib is concerned is a “liberty” 
not a “claim-right”. Neyers’ claim is therefore baseless. Furthermore, even if he tried to rework his 
reliance on Weinrib – placing weight on the abuse of a Hohfeldian liberty – he would still be ensnared 
by another major problem: the fact that such Kantian analysis of what grounds lawful means 
conspiracy121 is entirely absent from the relevant cases. This is significant because, as Scott Hershovitz 
notes, it is true that “judges sometimes grasp for principles they can’t quite articulate. But for the most 
part, they are pretty good at saying what they mean, and the reasons they marshal in their opinions are 
in fact the grounds for their decisions”.122   
So are McBride and Bagshaw right, after all, to be hesitant about seeing lawful means conspiracy 
in a fashion akin to an abuse of rights? Perhaps not, for it is arguably the right to freedom of association 
that is abused in such cases. The relevant public law character of this right stems from the fact that 
freedom of association is enshrined in article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. By 
virtue of this fact, the corresponding duty binds only public bodies. Also, it has certainly been argued 
that, historically, this tort was best understood as an abuse of the very similar statutory right to 
associate and form trade unions. Fridman argued over half a century ago that, although “men have 
the legal power to combine, such power may only be exercised with a rightful and justified intention” 
and that “improper motive destroys the legality of the exercise of the power”.123  
 
Importantly, identifying that our four torts all involve abuses of public (or quasi-public) powers only 
takes us so far. Adverting to such a link falls a long way short of actually justifying their existence. And it 
also fails to explain why the malicious abuse of private powers does not similarly result in liability.  
What then is the justificatory magic in the abuse of public powers? 
Perhaps the best answer to this question is that public powers are generally created for a specific 
purpose. So, whereas the private right of the defendant in Bradford v Pickles to extract water percolating 
under his land could be said to exist for any number of purposes (such as making concrete, watering 
crops or giving it to animals), the same cannot be said of public powers which are created with a 
particular purpose in mind. It is therefore relatively easy, and arguably appropriate, to attach liability 
to the malicious abuse of those powers (especially when the best interpretation of malice seems to be 
that of acting for improper purposes).  It is far easier to show that D has acted for an improper purpose 
when the purpose for which D is empowered to act is laid down in law.   
With the misfeasance tort, any public officer in the frame for liability will have been granted 
certain powers in order to fulfil particular statutory functions. It seems apt, then, that when she acts 
inconsistently with the functions with which she has been entrusted, she should be held accountable. 
And when her breaking this trust in bad faith causes loss to private individuals, a respectable case can 
                                                 
119 Weinrib (n 46) 30. 
120 Bizarrely, he states clearly that his ultimate aim is “to suggest that a rights-based account of the law can … explain 
[various malice-based torts]”: Neyers (n 83) 310. Yet, rights-based accounts concentrate on C’s (not D’s) rights! 
121 Weinrib offers his analysis as a basis for understanding all abuse of power torts. But it obviously cannot explain the 
misfeasance tort which attends to the abuse of public functions and not the abuse of self-chosen private pursuits. 
122 S Hershovitz, “The Search for a Grand Unified Theory of Tort Law” (2017) 130 Harv L Rev 942, 969. 
123 Fridman (n 41) 497 (italics in the original).  
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be made that her accountability should sound in tort.124 After all, as Aronsen observes: “while abuse 
of public power has long been the over-arching theme of judicial review… compensation is not in the 
suite of judicial review remedies”.125 
The sibling torts of abuse of process and malicious prosecution can equally be seen in terms of 
the abuse of a power that exists for a particular public purpose: the furtherance of the rule of law. 
Joseph Raz has certainly argued that access to justice is integral to the rule of law.126  However, our 
being invested with a right to such access has its limits: it is not a right that we can invoke for improper 
purposes. As was said by Issacs J in Varawa v Howard Smith Co, much as we are entitled to engage the 
legal process in order to vindicate our rights, our right to access to justice must not to be used “merely 
as a stalking horse to coerce the defendant in some way entirely outside the ambit of the legal claim 
upon which the court is asked to adjudicate”.127  
The right to freedom of association, which is abused in the tort of lawful means conspiracy, also 
exists only for the pursuit of proper purposes. As Brownlee has explained, we overestimate the value 
of our freedom of association if we think it entails a general, “Hohfeldian moral permission to act”.128 
The better, and more accurate, view is that it confers only a circumscribed freedom to act: it gives us 
certain “rights of conduct” but these “do not immunise us from criticism when we exercise them to 
act wrongly”.129 Put otherwise, the right to associative freedom carries only a right to act for legitimate 
purposes. No surprise, then, that article 11(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights should 
spell out that a citizen’s right to freedom of association includes “the right to form and to join trade 
unions for the protection of his interests”. Nor should it surprise us that the European Court of Human 
Rights has repeatedly stressed that the words in italics “are not redundant”.130 The article 11 freedom 
is designed to be used only in the furtherance of proper purposes.  
 
 
V. Are the “Malice Torts” Ultimately Necessary? 
 
Notwithstanding the interpretive case that can mounted in defence of the four torts upon which this 
article centres, there remains one final matter that needs to be considered. It is whether there is any 
practical necessity for these torts. Some senior judges doubt whether malicious prosecution offers 
anything that is not already available via a different tort.131 Lawful means conspiracy and abuse of 
process are hardly ever successfully invoked, and the Law Commission recently considered whether 
the misfeasance tort should be abolished. So do these torts serve a distinctively useful purpose? 
  
 
A.  Misfeasance in a Public Office 
In Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen, the Law Commission reported that in its 
consultation paper, it had “suggested that this tort was not fulfilling any useful purpose … [and] that 
                                                 
124 See Nolan (n 82) 183-6. 
125 Mark Aronson, “Misfeasance in Public Office: Some Unfinished Business” (2016) 132 LQR 426, 427. 
126 The rule of law, he argues, requires that “the courts should be easily accessible”: J Raz, The Authority of Law, 2d ed 
(Oxford 2009) 217.  
127 (1911) 13 CLR 35, 91 (Isaacs J). 
128 K Brownlee, “Freedom of Association: It’s not What You Think” (2015) 35 OJLS 267, 271. 
129 ibid, 277. 
130 See, eg, Wilson v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 20, [42]; Tum Haber Sen v Turkey (2008) 46 EHRR 19, [28]; Danilenkov 
v Russia (2014) 58 EHRR 19, [121]. 
131 Gregory v Portsmouth City Council [2000] 1 AC 419, 432 (Lord Steyn)  
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it should be abolished”.132 It then acknowledged that many consultees disagreed pointing out that the 
misfeasance tort “played a necessary role as a marker for particularly opprobrious action by public 
officials ... [allowing] exemplary damages … to reinforce the seriousness of the public body’s wrongful 
actions”.133 Combine this with the fact that the accountability of public officers is vital to our placing 
trust in (and thus enhancing the functional capacity of) public power,134 and it is clear the tort has an 




B. Malicious prosecution 
In Willers, Lord Mance (in the minority) observed colourfully, that:  
 
in an era when private prosecutions have largely disappeared, the tort of malicious prosecution of 
criminal proceedings is virtually extinct. To create a tort of malicious prosecution of civil proceedings 
might in these circumstances be thought to come close to necromancy”.136  
 
Lord Toulson disagreed entirely observing: “[it] is far from being a thing of the past”.137 So who was 
right? Certainly, a Westlaw search reveals roughly 20 reported cases of this tort per year, the great 
majority of which involve defendants who have initiated criminal proceedings. But in addition to the 
enduring vitality of the tort in connection with criminal prosecutions is the practical usefulness of now 
being able to sue someone for the malicious pursuit of civil proceedings. In Gregory, Lord Steyn had 
opposed this development. He said that he was “not persuaded that the general extension of the tort 
to civil proceedings has been shown to be necessary if one takes into account the protection afforded 
by other related torts”.138 He enumerated four such candidates: defamation, malicious falsehood, 
conspiracy, misfeasance in a public office.139 Yet in saying this he seemingly overlooked some 
important limitations of these other torts.   
In defamation, a claimant may be stymied by the rule granting immunity to a witness in respect 
of evidence given in a court, even where the evidence is falsely and maliciously given. Malicious 
falsehood is narrow of scope: it applies only to statements made about the claimant or his property. 
Conspiracy requires a defendant to have acted in combination with a third person; while the 
misfeasance tort only applies to defendants who are public officers. It cannot safely be asserted, 
therefore, that malicious pursuit of civil proceedings is an unnecessary fifth wheel on the coach.   
Equally, the rule that the loser pays costs in a civil case offers no guarantee that those who are 
maliciously sued will not suffer financially. Allowing an action for malicious pursuit of civil 
proceedings can address this problem. In Willers, the costs order was for £1.7m. Yet the actual costs 
incurred in defending the action came to £3.9m. Thanks to the existence of the tort of malicious 
prosecution, the claimant could recover the difference. 
 
                                                 
132 Law Com No 322, 2010, [3.65]. 
133 ibid [3.66]. 
134 This argument belongs to Martin Loughlin: “constraints, which ensure that public power is wielded only for public 
purposes, bolster the confidence of the people in the integrity of government”: M Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford 
2003) 85. For application of this thinking to the misfeasance tort, see Nolan (n 82) 183-6. 
135 Nolan (n 82) 178. 
136 Willers (n 12) [131]. 
137 ibid [43]. 
138 Gregory (n 114) 432.   
139 ibid [431]-[432]. 
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C. Abuse of Process 
Abuse of process has very limited practical utility. There is a distinct paucity of successful reported cases 
but this, by itself, does not mean that it is completely devoid of utility. In particular, unlike malicious 
prosecution, it can be relied upon even before the abusive proceedings have terminated in the 
claimant’s favour. It can therefore be seen as a useful companion to its better known sibling, malicious 
prosecution.140 In any event, the fact that it is seldom successfully invoked is no reason to abolish it. 
It would be foolhardy to expend effort in discarding it when keeping it requires none, and it could – 
on occasion – prove useful. Furthermore, it may have a useful deterrent effect on those who would 
seek to abuse the legal process. It catches those who employ proceedings they are entitled to bring,141 
as a means of extorting something from the defendant to which they have no right.142 Of course, 
deterrence requires knowledge of such potential liability. But a good lawyer could be expected to warn 
her client of the dangers of abusing the legal process.  
 
 
D. Lawful Means Conspiracy 
Lawful means conspiracy is also seldom used in practice. Unlike the other three torts, however, it is 
difficult to see a specific practical function that it fulfils. It is unlikely to have any significant deterrent 
effect, since few, not trained in the law, would imagine that it can be tortious do certain things in 
combination that, if done alone, would be lawful. Equally, where conspirators have the predominant 
purpose of harming another, it normally will be the case that some other tort will be available for 
which the defendant could be liable as either an immediate or a joint tortfeasor. 
On the other hand, there is a handful of reported cases in which this tort has proved useful. 
And as more than one Law Lord has noted, now that it has been around for so long it is “it is too late 
to do anything about it”.143 It is “too well established to be discarded”.144 It is hard, therefore to see 





There are four main torts in which malice is an essential ingredient of liability. Claims that they are 
anomalous or anachronistic actions are much too glibly made. If there were just one tort requiring 
proof of malice, or if they could be shown to have lapsed into desuetude, then such claims may have 
more traction. But, as we have seen, neither of these conditions obtain. At the same time, the idea that 
any of these torts can be characterised as sui generis can also be rebuffed by reference to the two features 
which link them together. They are all animated by a single conception of malice, and they all provide 
redress for abuses of public (or quasi-public) powers. 
When a key ingredient – in our case, malice – bears the same meaning across a range of torts, the 
idea that this has occurred by accident or error is difficult to accept. Malice in all four torts can be 
understood in terms of acts done for improper purposes. This is significant since the second common 
                                                 
140 “[T]he two torts sprang from the same tree”: Crawford (n 3) [62] (Lord Wilson). 
141 Abuse of process does not, unlike malicious prosecution, require the absence of a reasonable cause: see Crawford (n 3) 
[62] (Lord Wilson). 
142 The tort functions to target X where X uses proceedings he is entitled to initiate in order to coerce Y in some way that 
lies outside the proper ambit of the claim: Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35, 91 (Isaacs J). 
143 L Hoffmann, “The Rise and Fall of the Economic Torts” in S Degeling et al (eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Pyrmont, 
NSW 2011) 115.  
144 Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173, 189 (Lord Diplock).  
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denominator relies on the fact that acts done for improper purposes can be cashed out in terms of an 
abuse of public (or quasi-public) power principle that helps justify these torts. Malicious prosecution 
and abuse of process both serve to curtail abuses of the power granted to all citizens to access the 
Queen’s courts (where this power exists for the purpose of enhancing or ensuring the rule of law). 
The misfeasance tort addresses abuses of powers granted to public officers in order to enable them 
to fulfil specific public purposes laid down in statute. Lawful means conspiracy addresses the abuse 
of the basic right of freedom of association that we all have in order to allow us to pursue certain 
common purposes that are for the good (such as a worker’s right “to form and to join trade unions for 
the protection of his interests”146).  
For all that these torts operate according to a shared conception of malice, and for all that they 
can be justified by reference to their theoretical usefulness in relation to abuses of public powers, it 
remains true that they are relatively infrequently used.147 On the other hand, it by no means follows 
from this observation that we should discard them; for it is certainly wrong to think that the limited 
work that they do can always be done by some other cause of action. Equally, it would be wrong to 
afford them serious attention on the basis of their limited practical significance, for these torts have 
the potential to ground serious challenges to popular theories of tort law. The fact that they cannot 
easily be dismissed as anomalies or sui generis causes of action is a point that is seldom if ever 
appreciated by leading contemporary tort theorists. Yet these torts pose challenges for those theories 
insofar as they purport to offer grand, reductionist accounts of tort law.148  
 
                                                 
146 European Convention on Human Rights, Art 11(1). 
147 The courts’ ability to strike out vexatious litigation and the rule that losers pay costs reduce the incidence of malicious 
prosecution and abuse of process cases. Lawful means conspiracy cases are rare because there are few things that are done 
that are designed to cause loss to another that are prima facie lawful. The need to show malice combined with the fact that 
only public officers can be sued restricts the number misfeasance tort cases.  
148 One form of challenge is based on tort law’s remarkable heterogeneity (on which, see Murphy (n 5)); another is based 
on the fact that these torts have a distinctly public not private dimension, contrary to popular conceptions of tort law as 
exclusively a creature of private law (on which see, eg, J Murphy, “Misfeasance in a Public Office: A Tort Law Misfit” 
(2012) 32 OJLS 51). 
